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1	 Introduction
The long-awaited and much-anticipated EMV (Europay, Mastercard and 
Visa) system aimed at combating credit and debit card fraud has recently 
been launched by ABSA. VISA branded debit cards will contain a special 
chip and transactions will be verified, using a four-digit personal identifica-
tion number, which will be keyed in instead of the signing of receipts.1 The 
introduction of the EMV bank chip smart card system, which is to replace 
magnetic stripe cards with microchip cards, is aimed at eliminating the risks 
of unauthorised use.2 A smart card is a plastic card based on cryptography 
with a microcomputer chip in it, which is swiped at a payment terminal, or 
smart card reader that verifies the smart card as being genuine by sending 
a random code. This code in turn is responded to by the microchip, which 
together with a security access code such as a PIN (Personal Identification 
Number), acts as a type of secret key. Smart card technology therefore refers 
to the microcomputer-embedded technology linked to the card rather than to 
the purpose of the card.
The cloning of payment instruments poses a formidable challenge to banks 
and consumers. The cloning of credit and debit cards is often referred to as 
skimming, which entails that the magnetic strip on the back of a credit card is 
copied using a hand held card reader.5 Magnetic-stripe card technology is there-
fore flawed in the sense that the data stored on the stripe can be altered by a per-
son who has access to the device which records the information and the mag-
netic-stripe credit card can be replicated (cloned) on a personal computer.
1 “ABSA, VISA Launch Product to Curb Card ‘Skimming’” Business Day Friday May  2007 19  See also 
Schulze “E Money and Electronic Fund Transfers” 200 1 SA Merc LJ 50 5-5 for a discussion of the 
nature of smart cards
2 Schulze 200 1 SA Merc LJ 5 and n 21  See further Havenga & Havenga, Kelbrick, McGregor, Schulze, 
Van der Linde & Van der Merwe General Principles of Commercial Law (200) 90-91  EMV (Europay, 
Mastercard and Visa) is a global card standard that has been accepted by South Africa, but which remains 
to be fully implemented despite the implementation date being 1 January 2005  This card has a digital 
signature, and transaction slips will no longer be needed  
 Havenga et al Kommersiële Reg 10-11  Schulze 200 1 SA Merc LJ 55  See also Schulze “Smartcards 
and E-money: New Developments Bring New Problems” 200 1 SA Merc LJ 70 707
 Schulze 200 1 SA Merc LJ 5
5 Business Day Friday May  2007 19
 Schulze 200 1 SA Merc LJ 55
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Following on from our previous article on cloned cheques,7 the focus of this 
article will be on cloned credit cards. It will be investigated whether the EMV 
system is a miracle cure to credit card cloning in particular, or whether pitfalls 
exist, which need to be guarded against. During the transition period from 
the current credit card system to the bank chip smart card, it will no doubt be 
important to ensure that both types of credit card are interoperable and that ter-
minals would be able to accept both magnetic stripes and magnetic chips.8 This 
in itself will not be without its own challenges, especially as far as the preven-
tion of cloned credit cards is concerned, as has since been discovered in France 
and the United Kingdom which already implement the EMV system.9
In France, algorithmic research (ARX) has uncovered security problems 
related to the exposure of PIN codes of magnetic stripe and EMV cards used 
at ATM’s (Automated Teller Machines).10 Anyone with access to the PIN veri-
fication facility could use hardware to reveal the PIN codes and either perpe-
trate fraudulent transactions or manufacture cards with different PIN codes 
to those of the legitimate cards.11 The French system experienced further set-
backs as some electric point terminals used for smart cards still had magnetic 
swipe readers. The reason for this is that certain ATM cash terminals were only 
able to use data stored on the cards’ magnetic stripe due to incompatibility 
problems with cards embedded with chip technology.12 Serge Humpich, a  
year-old engineer, discovered flaws in the smart card microchip system used in 
France and actually managed to crack the French banking smart card system 
by fabricating a fake smartcard that was recognised by electronic point of sale 
terminals.1
A further report on fraud-related EMV payment, perpetrated at petrol sta-
tions with unattended payment terminals, has been made in the United King-
dom. Money has reportedly been stolen from customers after their payment 
card data was skimmed (cloned). The reason cited for this is that the cards 
were swiped through a magnetic stripe reader, which captured the data. In the 
process, the terminal also detected whether a chip was present and the transac-
7 Pretorius & Van der Bijl “A New Mode of Forgery: The Rise of Cloned and Washed Cheques” 200 18:2 
SA Merc LJ 19
8 Schulze 200 1 SA Merc LJ 5
9 “Card Technology” Newsroom Global Newswatch vol 11 0/01/0 Card Tech 8 200 WLNR 991895; 
“French Card Hacker Convicted” available at http://www theregister co uk/2000/02/2/french_card_
hacker_convicted (accessed 10 May 2007)
10 “Algorithmic Research Reveals PIN Processing Weakness that Allow Payment-Card Fraud” available 
at http:// www smartcardstrends com/det_atc php?idu (accessed 8 May 2007)  See also Diners Club SA 
(Pty) Ltd v Singh 200  SA 0 (D)  
11 “Algorithmic Research Reveals PIN Processing Weakness that Allow Payment-Card Fraud” available at 
http:// www smartcardstrends com/det_atc php?idu (accessed 8 May 2007)  
12 “French Card Hacker Convicted” available at http://www theregister co uk/2000/02/2/french_card_
hacker_convicted (accessed 10 May 2007)
1 “French Card Hacker Convicted” available at http://www theregister co uk/2000/02/2/french_card_
hacker_convicted (accessed 10 May 2007)  See further “Security: Hackers Reveal How to Forge a Bank 
Card” available at http:// www tla ch/TLA/NEWS/2000sec/2000017credicard htm  There it is men-
tioned that the information hacked included deciphered codes which validated forgeries where micro-
chip-carrying cards were fed into ATM’s, or mobile phone style terminals where amounts are immedi-
ately debited once the card has been read and the PIN number has been entered  See further “Smart Card 
Crypto Genius Sent to Trial” available at http:// the register co uk/2000/01/2/smart-card-crypto-genius-
sent (accessed 8 May 2007)
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tion was completed with the detection of the chip.1 Once magnetic-stripe and 
PIN data are captured, cards can be cloned, thus enabling the perpetration of 
ATM fraud.
The EMV system is undoubtedly a welcome advancement in technology. 
However, it will be shown that the cloning of credit cards will not necessarily 
disappear for a number of reasons. First, problems will remain where certain 
banks or issuers of tripartite credit cards have not implemented the system.15 
Secondly, there might be flaws in the system related to the migration or tran-
sition process, which have not yet become apparent as has been the case in 
the United Kingdom and France, where the smart card bank chip system has 
already been implemented. Thirdly, due to the expense involved, this form 
of technology might not be utilised in bipartite credit cards.1 Lastly, prob-
lems could still emerge where purchases are made telephonically or over the 
internet. These are merely some of the practical problems that may occur. An 
important question that must of necessity be asked, relates to risk allocation. 
Should the cardholder bear the largest part of the risk or should the risk rest 
with the bank or issuer of the card? This question can perhaps best be answered 
by distinguishing between the position pertaining to unauthorised use of the 
original credit card and the position where there is unauthorised use involving 
a cloned credit card. Both these positions will be explored after delving into the 
nature of a credit card relationship.
2	 	The	nature	of	a	credit	card	and	the	legal	relationships	
between	the	parties
A credit card is an instrument of payment. It is issued by the card issuer to 
the cardholder, who enjoys revolving credit and can use the card to draw cash 
or to purchase goods or services up to a prescribed limit. The amount pro-
vided in credit should then be paid back within a specific period, and interest 
becomes payable on certain outstanding amounts.17 There are usually three par-
ties to a credit card transaction, namely the cardholder (consumer), the issuer 
(credit provider)18 and the supplier. The transaction is usually implemented by 
way of a direct payment-obligation scheme based on a standard type contract.19 
Bilateral credit cards would involve two parties, namely the issuer/supplier, 
who would usually be the same party, and the cardholder. Credit cards have a 
number of purposes, and are mainly used for ATM withdrawals, internet and 
telecon shopping, and sale or service agreements.
1 “Card Technology” Newsroom Global Newswatch vol 11 0/01/0 Card Tech 8 200 WLNR 991895
15 The terms issuer/credit provider will be used interchangeably as well as cardholder/consumer in keeping 
in line with the terminology used in the National Credit Act  of 2005
1 There may, however, also be only two parties involved in credit card transactions, for example, if the sup-
plier is also the issuer of the card, which is often the case with certain chain stores
17 Schulze “Of Credit Cards, Unauthorized Withdrawals and Fraudulent Credit-Card Users” 2005 17 SA 
Merc LJ 202; Cornelius “The Legal Nature of Payment by Credit Card” 200 15 SA Merc LJ 15 15-157; 
R v Lambie 1981 2 All ER 77 (HL)
18 A credit provider is the party who extends credit under a credit facility (s 1 of Act  of 2005)  
19 Nagel & Roestoff Commercial Law (2000) 10 et seq  Note that the 200 version of this textbook does not 
contain references to the relationships on a credit card, which is why the earlier version is used
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Nagel & Roestoff20 state that:
“The issuer enters into a standard-form contract with the various suppliers, in terms of which the 
latter undertake to accept payment for goods or services by means of the credit cards issued by the 
former, while the issuer undertakes to refund the suppliers, subject to certain conditions and usually 
minus a certain percentage, for purchases made by the card holder. The issuer, therefore, takes upon 
himself the obligation to pay directly to the supplier. The issuer also enters into a standard-form con-
tract with every card holder which contains the conditions of use of the card and in terms of which the 
card holder may make payments up to a certain credit limit, the issuer debits the card holder with the 
amounts spent and the latter undertakes to repay these amounts, or a portion thereof, within a specific 
time directly to the issuer.”
The different types of relationship between the parties to a credit card trans-
action can be summarised as follows:21
The cardholder is normally authorised by the bank to obtain services or pur-
chase goods from various suppliers. The cardholder will be liable to reim-
burse the issuer once the latter has carried out the instructions of the card-
holder and paid the relevant supplier.
The relationship between the supplier and cardholder would be determined 
by the underlying contract, such as a contract of sale, between them. Upon 
completion and signing of a transaction slip, the supplier obtains a personal 
right against the issuer and the cardholder’s obligation will merely be sus-
pended until the supplier is paid by the issuer. Should payment not take 
place, the cardholder will be liable.
The relationship between supplier and issuer will usually entail that the 
issuer will reimburse the supplier in terms of their standard contract, which 
will also usually make provision for the presentation of the transaction slips 
to the issuer by the supplier.
The legal relationship between the parties to the credit card agreement could 
therefore be said to be regulated by the contract itself, the general principles 
of contract law and the National Credit Act  of 2005.22 The National Credit 
Act  of 2005 replaces both the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980 and the 
Usury Act 8 of 197 and covers a wide spectrum of credit agreements. A 
credit agreement is a credit transaction, credit facility, or a credit guarantee, 
or a combination of these three transactions.2 An agreement is defined in sec-
tion 1 as including an arrangement or understanding between or among two or 
more parties, which purports to establish a relationship in law between those 
parties.
20 Commercial Law 11
21 See Nagel et al Commercial Law 11-1, esp 1 where it is mentioned that the liability of a cardholder 
towards the issuer is based on mandate and loan for consumption; Oosthuizen (ed) Suid-Afrikaanse 
Handelsreg (199) 19; Cornelius 200 15 SA Merc LJ 15 1-171 for an alternate discussion of payment 
by credit card as being made in terms of an antecedent multilateral contract based primarily on delegation 
and novation; Schulze 2005 17 SA Merc LJ 202 20; Havenga et al General Principles of Commercial 
Law (200) 70; Sharrock Business Transactions Law (2002) 19-195
22 Note that The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (ECTA) 25 of 2002 does not provide 
exclusively for credit card schemes or electronic banking services for that matter and will therefore not be 
discussed further
2 S 8(1) of Act  of 2005  
•
•
•
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The provisions pertaining to credit facilities are applicable to credit card 
transactions. A credit facility is defined as such in section 8(3) of the National 
Credit Act  of 2005 if in terms of that agreement:
“(a)  A credit provider undertakes–
 (i)  to supply goods or services or to pay an amount or amounts, as determined by the consumer 
from time to time, to the consumer or on behalf of, or at the direction of, the consumer; 
and
 (ii)  either to–
  (aa)  defer the consumer’s obligation to pay any part of the cost of goods or services, or to 
repay to the credit provider any part of an amount contemplated in (i) or
  (bb)  bill the consumer periodically for any part of the cost of goods or services, or any part 
of an amount, contemplated in (i) and
(b)  any charge, fee or interest is payable to the credit provider in respect of –
 (i)  any amount deferred as contemplated in paragraph (a)(ii) (aa) or
 (ii)  any amount billed as contemplated in paragraph (a) (ii) (bb) and not paid within the time 
provided in the agreement.”
The Act therefore applies to both bipartite and tripartite credit cards. It 
would appear that the Act would apply to credit cards issued to the cardholder 
on the latter’s insistence. It is therefore doubtful whether the Act could apply 
to a cloned credit card as the latter is not issued to the credit cardholder (con-
sumer) on such person’s insistence and consensus or an understanding between 
the parties would be lacking. It becomes increasingly important to establish 
exactly as to what has been agreed upon in order to bind the cardholder to the 
contract and also for the determination of risk allocation. It is not unheard of 
for issuers to post credit cards (especially bipartite credit cards) to prospec-
tive and identified consumers in order to invite them to make use of a card 
with a pre-approved limit. The National Credit Act  of 2005 provides that a 
credit provider may not make an offer to enter into a credit agreement where 
the agreement will automatically come into existence unless the consumer 
declines the offer.2 It could perhaps be argued that the posting of a credit card 
increases the risk of credit card fraud or cloning and that the risk should there-
fore lie with the issuer as the card has not been issued at the insistence of the 
cardholder, nor has such cardholder had the opportunity of declining the offer 
expressly envisaged by the Act.
If a consumer has not been properly informed of a unilateral increase in the 
credit limit, the question arises whether there can be any mutual understand-
ing between the parties. This might well be the case where written notifica-
tion is sent via the postal system, and the notice then goes missing, thereby 
enabling credit card fraud to be perpetrated in the interim up to the new limit. 
Is it then reasonable to hold a consumer liable? Again the National Credit Act 
 of 2005 expressly provides that a credit provider may not make an offer to 
increase the credit limit under a credit facility on the basis that the limit will be 
automatically increased unless the consumer declines the offer.25 Section 119 
further provides that a credit limit may only be increased with the agreement of 
2 S 7(1)  In s 7() the Act provides that where a credit agreement is entered into as a result of an offer 
contemplated in s 7(1), the agreement is unlawful and void
25 S 7(2)  In s 7(5) the Act provides that where a provision is entered into as envisaged by s 7(2), such 
provision is unlawful and void
THE CLONING OF CREDIT CARDS 5
the consumer or unilaterally, subject to certain conditions, where the consumer 
has previously requested in writing that the credit limit be increased automati-
cally from time to time.2 It is important to note that such a specific request may 
neither be made orally nor be part of the standard provisions that have been 
assented to by the consumer.27
The implications of the Act and contractual provisions concluded by the var-
ious parties will now be considered in more detail in a comparison of the posi-
tion relating to unauthorised transactions based on the original credit card, and 
the position applicable to unauthorised use involving cloned credit cards.
3	 Unauthorised	use	of	the	original	credit	card
The unauthorised use of the original issued credit card could stem from the 
use thereof at a supplier’s pay point, at an automated teller machine (ATM) 
where cash is withdrawn or perhaps over the internet or telephone when used 
as a method of payment. Should the risk in such instances lie with the supplier, 
issuer or cardholder? As far as unauthorised card use pertaining to the origi-
nal credit card issued is concerned, self-regulation is usually opted for and the 
individual contract should be consulted. It will usually provide that the card-
holder bears the risk for unauthorised transactions until the issuer is informed, 
whereafter the issuer will bear the loss.28 These provisions would of course 
be subject to the provisions of the National Credit Act  of 2005, which also 
makes provision for unauthorised card use.29
Schulz states that:0
“The issuers of payment cards and e-money (in South Africa, limited to banks) unilaterally determine 
the rules and procedures in terms of which cards and e-money are to be used including who bears the 
risk in the case of loss arising from the use of such products. Suffice it to say that the card or purse 
holder bears the largest part of the risk of loss resulting from the use of the card or electronic purse.”
The provisions of the National Credit Act  of 2005 relating to unauthor-
ised transactions are clear. It provides that the credit provider (issuer) may not 
impose a liability on a consumer (card holder) for the use of credit facilities 
after the consumer has reported the loss or theft of the associated card, per-
sonal identification code (PIN) or number or similar device. Liability may be 
imposed where the consumer’s signature appears on the voucher, sales slip or 
record or where the credit provider has sufficient evidence to establish that the 
consumer authorised or was responsible for that particular use of the credit 
facility.1 The implementation of the EMV system could be problematic as far 
as this section is concerned as the use of this system eliminates the need for the 
use of transaction slips and could consequently have evidentiary implications 
with regard to proving that the consumer signed for that specific transaction.
2 S 119(a)-(c) and s 119()
27 S 119(5)(a)
28 Nagel et al Commercial Law 1; Schulze 2005 17 SA Merc LJ 205; Havenga et al General Principles of 
Commercial Law 71  As far as unauthorised ATM withdrawals are concerned, see Diner’s Club SA (Pty) 
Ltd v Singh 200  SA 0 (D) 59A where the issuer placed the risk of wrongful use on its client
29 See s 9 in this regard
0 Schulze 200 1 SA Merc LJ 70 715
1 S 9 of Act  of 2005
 STELL LR 2007 2
It might be argued that the provisions of the Act pertaining to credit cards 
and the unauthorised use thereof are not as extensive as they could perhaps be. 
In the United States, the Consumer Credit Protection Act2 provides that no 
credit card may be issued unless a response or a request has been received. 
The liability of a holder of a credit card is somewhat more extensive in that 
a cardholder will not be liable inter alia for the unauthorised use of a credit 
card unless such card is accepted as a credit card; the liability is not in excess 
of $50; the card issuer gives adequate notice to the cardholder of the potential 
liability; the card issuer has provided the cardholder with a description of a 
means by which the card issuer may be notified of loss or theft of the card; the 
unauthorised use occurs before the card issuer has been notified that an unau-
thorised use of the credit card has occurred or may occur as the result of loss, 
theft, or otherwise; and the card issuer has provided a method whereby the user 
of such card can be identified as the person authorised to use it. The cardholder 
will also not be liable for the unauthorised use of a credit card in excess of his 
liability for such use under a specific law or under any agreement with the card 
issuer. The aforementioned Act also provides for penalties for the fraudulent 
use of a credit card in the form of a fine not exceeding $10,000 or imprison-
ment of not more than ten years, or a combination of both.5
If the same provisions used in the United States were used, more effective 
protection to consumers might be afforded in that the risk to consumers might 
be reduced even further. Examples of possible additional measures that could 
also perhaps be introduced could entail:
A credit card with a photo and signature against a hologram background 
together with smart card technology. An additional safeguard could be that 
the supplier could demand to see the person’s identity document for com-
parison purposes.
An express prohibition on the posting of credit cards to potential consum-
ers with pre-approved limits especially where the latter has not applied for 
a credit card. The posting of such a credit card could facilitate fraud as 
the card could be intercepted and a duplicate card be fabricated. Once the 
consumer decides to make use of the posted credit card with its attached 
terms and conditions, the wheels would have already been set in motion for 
unauthorised transactions to be concluded with the cloned card at will. This 
could foreseeably happen with either bipartite cards used by chain stores 
where smart card technology is not used or in the case of tripartite credit 
cards where the EMV system has not been implemented.
An automatically induced text message via e-mail or telecon, which is cur-
rently used on an ad-hoc basis by some issuers, could be made compulsory 
for all issuers, to inform a cardholder that a transaction has been completed, 
especially if the daily limit is reached. A disadvantage of this measure would 
2 Codified to 15 U S C  § 101 of the United States Code, Title 15 (Commerce and Trade), Chapter 1 (Con-
sumer Protection), Subchapter 1, Part A
 § 12   
 § 1
5 § 1
•
•
•
THE CLONING OF CREDIT CARDS 7
be that it would entail notification after the fact. However, it could be argued 
that at least the consumer would be alerted before a number of additional 
transactions are concluded.
With regard to unauthorised use of the original credit card and alleged 
unfair contractual terms, it would appear that the position in the cases of Din-
ers Club SA (Pty) Ltd v Singh36 and Sasfin Ltd v Beukes7 would apply. Even if 
the one party is placed within the economic power of another, which exceeds 
the reasonable protection of the latter party’s interest, such contract can still 
be enforced. The Court will also take into account various factors such as the 
interests of individual parties, good faith, the alleged unfairness in the contract 
and the interests of society.8
With regard to the allocation of risk, the Court held in the Diners Club case9 
that clauses may be one-sided and favour the issuer so that the risk of wrong-
ful use is placed on the customer.0 The relevant clause in this case provided 
that the cardholder would be liable regardless of who made use of the PIN. 
The Court held further that it would not be contrary to public policy to hold the 
cardholder bound to the contractual terms and conditions.1
It is important to note that the fraud perpetrated in this case did not relate to 
a duplicate card but to the original issued card and PIN.2 A distinction must 
surely be drawn with regard to the allocation of risk between parties on the 
original credit card as opposed to a fabricated card. The reason is that the terms 
and conditions linked to the credit card contract would apply to the specific 
card which the cardholder signed for, and not to the cloned credit card. It is 
submitted that a different set of principles should as a matter of necessity apply 
to a separate card. Drawing a distinction is therefore critical especially where 
there is fabrication of a duplicate card and even more so if a card is skimmed 
by dishonest insiders, as this could have dire consequences for oblivious or 
unsuspecting consumers.
As far as payment itself is concerned, there is support for the view that 
purported payment by a credit card that does not comply with the contractual 
requirements is void, and does not constitute payment in an analogous way to 
the use of counterfeit notes. Accordingly, the risk will inevitably lie with the 
 200  SA 0 (D)
7 1989 1 SA 1 (A)
8 Schulze 2005 17 SA Merc LJ 208  See in general Van der Merwe & Van Huyssteen “The Force of Agree-
ments: Valid, Void, Voidable, Unenforceable” 1995 58 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 
59; Lubbe “Bona Fides, Billikheid en die Openbare Belang in die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg” 1990 
1 Stell LR 7; Bank of Lisbon & South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988  SA 580 (A)
9 200  SA 0 (D)
0 59A  See also Schulze “Unauthorized Cash Withdrawals with a Credit Card, and Unfair Contract Terms” 
2005 12: JBL 1 et seq for a full discussion of the Diners Club case
1 59D-E  See also Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 9 1-1
2 0D-I
 Note that the case draws no distinction between cloned (duplicate card) and the original issued card and 
at times seems to blur the distinction between the two  See 7A, 8C-D and 1E-F
 Cornelius 200 15 SA Merc LJ 15 18  The author states (171) that he is of the view that payment by 
means of credit card constitutes novation whereby the supplier can claim from the credit card issuer  
Where the contractual requirements for valid payment have not been met, the cardholder will be bound in 
terms of the underlying contract to the supplier
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supplier in such a case, with the cardholder remaining liable in terms of the 
underlying contract.
4	 Unauthorised	use	involving	cloned	credit	cards
As is the case with the unauthorised use of the credit card originally issued, 
fraud perpetrated with a cloned credit card could also stem from the use thereof 
at a supplier’s pay point, at an automated teller machine (ATM) where cash is 
withdrawn, or perhaps over the internet or telephone as a method of payment. 
Based on the assumption that the cardholder is not fraudulently involved in 
an unauthorised transaction involving the use of the cloned card, the position 
relating to the allocation of risk in each of the aforementioned situations might 
be the following:
In the case of use at a supplier’s pay point, the original cardholder and origi-
nal card are not involved. The risk necessarily has to lie with the supplier 
or the issuer in the case of tripartite cards, or with the supplier, who is also 
issuer, in the case of bipartite credit cards. In such a situation, the mandate 
of the cardholder has not been complied with, as payment is not in accord-
ance with the instructions of the latter. Purchases made with cloned bipar-
tite credit cards surely cannot be attributed to the original cardholder: there 
is no contractual relationship between the supplier and original cardholder 
linked to the use of the cloned card, nor is there an underlying contract of 
sale which can be relied upon to hold the latter liable.
In the second instance, where a withdrawal is made at an ATM, the origi-
nal cardholder would not typically be involved unless such cardholder is 
involved with the fraudsters. The issuer would possibly only be able to 
recoup the amount in terms of delictual liability as there is typically no 
contract on which to rely upon. Again, should any payment be made, it will 
neither be in accordance with the instructions of the cardholder nor with the 
terms and conditions of use.
In the third scenario the cloned card details are furnished to a supplier 
telephonically or over the internet. The supplier would look to the issuer 
for payment as there is a contractual relationship between these parties. The 
relevant transaction slips are usually presented by the supplier to the issuer. 
Where transaction slips are signed on cloned cards or where perhaps no 
transaction slips are signed at all in telephonic or internet purchases, the sit-
uation becomes more complex in determining which of two innocent parties 
should bear the loss. The implementation of the EMV system complicates 
the matter further, especially where the use of transaction slips is eliminated, 
as this makes it difficult to prove negligence (or the absence thereof), and 
the National Credit Act  of 2005 only provides for the imposition of lia-
bility on a consumer where the latter’s signature appears on a voucher, sales 
slip or similar record.5 In determining whether the supplier or issuer should 
bear the risk in such cases, the contract could possibly be relied upon, or an 
5 S 9(2)(a)
•
•
•
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answer could possibly be sought in the law of delict. In establishing who 
would bear the risk of loss in these situations, the position with regard to 
the cloning of cheques will briefly be referred to as a useful comparison in 
attempting to identify a possible solution to the allocation of the risk.
Cheque fraud, which can also be perpetrated by cloning, has often been the 
focus of attention.7 When information is removed from the entire cheque, it is 
known as cheque washing. Alterations are effected by using chemicals or sol-
vents, which include acetone (nail polish remover), bleach, brake fluid, carbon 
tetrachloride (carpet cleaner) and special high performance erasers.8 Cloned 
cheques are normally produced using advanced colour photocopiers or sophis-
ticated software whilst the original cheque is still available and information 
may also be fraudulently encoded (cloned) in magnetic ink in the form of a 
magnetic ink character recognition (MICR) line onto another document pur-
porting to be a cheque. Indicators that a cheque may have been tampered with 
could be that the MICR is glossy or shiny whereas magnetic ink is normally 
dull and/or MICR numbers might be missing.9
The cloning of a cheque therefore in essence entails that a cheque is inter-
cepted and the original cheque is used to manufacture a duplicate fraudulent 
cheque. Each cheque is processed through the Automated Clearing Bureau 
(ACB), which uses electronic data equipment to ensure Magnetic Ink Char-
acter Recognition.50 As far as the allocation of risk on a cloned cheque is con-
cerned, it has been suggested in a prior article that should there be no fault on 
 The principles applicable to an action based on contract and an action founded upon delict should be care-
fully distinguished  A concurrence of contractual and delictual actions has been recognised (see Media 
24 Ltd v Grobler 2005  SA 28 (SCA); Holtzhausen v ABSA Bank 2005 2 All SA 50 (SCA))  One should 
bear in mind, however, that the onus of proof differs in respect of delictual and contractual claims  In the 
case of a breach of contract, the onus would fall on the defendant to show that he was not negligent  In 
a delictual action, the onus rests on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant is negligent  See Neethling, 
Potgieter & Visser Law of Delict (200) 22  
7 Other types of cheque fraud include forged signatures and endorsements, cheque kiting and the washing 
or altering of cheques  Cheque kiting requires multiple bank accounts where the kiter takes advantage of 
the clearance period required by a bank and money is moved in between accounts  See Pretorius & Van 
der Bijl 200 18:2 SA Merc LJ 19; “Cheque Fraud: Fraud Investigator (SA)” available at http://www
fraudinvestigator co za/cheque_fraud htm; “APACS (UK organization)” available at http://www apacs
org uk/payments_industry/payment_fraud_2 html ; “Fraud the Facts: APACS article, UK” available at 
http://www apacs org uk/resources_publications/documents/FraudtheFacts200; “National Check Fraud 
Centre” available at http://www ckfraud org/; “Federal Reserve System: Check Fraud Report” available 
at http://www frbservices org/Retail/pdf/CheckFraud pdf; “Wikipedia: Check Washing” available at 
http://en wikipedia org/wiki/Check_washing; “Black Market Press: Chemicals Used” available at http://
www blackmarketpress net/info/bank/Check_Washing htm (all accessed 10 May 2007)
8 Pretorius & Van der Bijl 200 18:2 SA Merc LJ 197; Trans-Atlantic Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Minister 
of Transport 2002 2 SA 17 (T) 171C-D; “Cheque Fraud: Fraud Investigator (SA)” available at http://
www fraudinvestigator co za/cheque_fraud htm ; “Federal Reserve System: Check Fraud Report” avail-
able at http://www frbservices org/Retail/pdf/CheckFraud pdf; “APACS (UK organization)” available at 
http://www apacs org uk/payments_industry/payment_fraud_2 html; “Fraud the Facts: APACS article” 
available at http://www apacs org uk/resources_publications/documents/FraudtheFacts200; “National 
Check Fraud Centre” available at http://www ckfraud org/ ; “Wikipedia: Check Washing” available at 
http://en wikipedia org/wiki/Check_washing ; “Black Market Press: Chemicals Used” available at http://
www blackmarketpress net/info/bank/Check_Washing htm.
9 Ibid. See further Pretorius & Van der Bijl 200 18:2 SA Merc LJ 19; R v Abankwah (Jerry) 200 EWCA 
Crim 1875  
50 MICR cheques have a code line, which have precoded characters in magnetic ink such as the serial num-
ber of the cheque, the drawer’s account number, the drawee bank’s branch code and a transaction code  
See Pretorius & Van der Bijl 200 18:2 SA Merc LJ 200
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the part of the drawer, the drawee bank would not be entitled to debit the cus-
tomer’s account with the amount on the forged cheque unless the alteration 
was apparent. It was argued that in such a case the collecting bank could also 
possibly incur delictual liability where it failed to notice the alteration or if 
there was negligence in the collection of the cheque.51 Furthermore, it was also 
submitted that where payment is made on a cloned cheque, such payment is 
made in accordance with the electronic information received through the ACB 
system and is thus not payment on the original cheque. Furthermore, such pay-
ment does not accord with the client’s instructions or mandate and the risk of 
the loss should lie with the bank for not complying with its mandate in terms 
of the bank-customer relationship.52
The bank-customer relationship is usually contractual in nature and clas-
sified as a contract of mandate whereby the bank renders services to the cus-
tomer upon the latter’s instructions.5 The exact terms and conditions of the 
bank-customer contract are mostly contained in standard contracts.5 As is the 
case with cheques, the terms and conditions pertaining to credit cards are also 
based upon a contractual issuer-cardholder relationship. However, a different 
set of principles will obviously apply to credit cards, since the provisions of 
the Bills of Exchange Act  of 19 are not applicable to credit cards, and 
credit cards are not negotiable instruments. One should also bear in mind that 
in the case of bipartite credit card agreements, the issuer is usually not a bank 
and so the bank-client relationship would not be applicable if such party does 
not qualify as a bank.55
An examination of legislation such as the National Credit Act  of 2005 
appears to confirm that where payment is made on a cloned credit card, it is not 
done with the authorisation of the card holder/consumer and is not conducted 
on behalf of, nor at the direction of, the consumer.5 The question now arises 
whether the bank could possibly be held liable where it pays on such an unau-
thorised transaction, as it is not in accordance with the terms and conditions of 
use and instructions of the client. It can further be asked whether the Appor-
tionment of Damages Act applies to transactions where both the cardholder 
and the issuer, or supplier and cardholder, are negligent.
Regarding the first question, the issuer is required to make payments on 
behalf of the correct person, namely the consumer or cardholder in the case of 
51 Pretorius & Van der Bijl 200 18:2 SA Merc LJ 202
52 See Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd 198 Ac 80 PC 10B-D  The Court states in this 
case that the “business of banking is the business not of the customer but of the bank  They offer a ser-
vice, which is to honour their customer’s cheques when drawn on an account in credit or within an agreed 
overdraft limit  If they pay out on cheques which are not his, they are acting outside their mandate and 
cannot plead his authority in justification of their debit to his account  This is a risk of the service which 
it is their business to offer ” See further Pretorius & Van der Bijl 200 18:2 SA Merc LJ 201-202; Malan & 
Pretorius Malan on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes in South African Law  ed (2002) 
5
5 Stassen “Die Regsaard van die Verhouding tussen Bank en Klient” 1980 2 Modern Business Law 77 79; 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Oneanate Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995  SA 510 (C) 50; Malan & Pretorius 
Malan on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes in South African Law par 20
5 Cranston Principles of Banking Law (2002) 1
55 Schulze 200 1 SA Merc LJ 70 71
5 A consumer includes the party to whom credit is granted under a credit facility  See s 1 of Act  of 2005 
in this regard
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the contractual relationships pertaining to a credit card. The orders of the client 
would be carried out in the form of transaction slips, which would need to be 
signed by the consumer on the completion of a transaction.57 Where the issuer 
has performed its obligations in accordance with the terms and conditions of 
use, the latter will be entitled to reimbursements for payments rendered on the 
cardholder’s behalf.58
Where a credit card is cloned, it would entail that payment is made on a sepa-
rate substitute credit card, which purports to be the original credit card. In such 
a case, it is clear that the terms and conditions of use are not complied with, 
as it is not payment in accordance with the client’s instructions. The signature 
on the transaction slips relating to the cloned card would also probably contain 
an unauthorised signature which again is not at the instruction of the client. It 
is therefore apparent that payment made on the cloned credit card is not pay-
ment made on the original credit card in accordance with the terms and condi-
tions of use. It is submitted that in such a case the issuer has not performed in 
terms of its mandate and should bear the risk, as the performance rendered is 
not made in terms of the original card issued to the client. The case of Tai Hing 
Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd59 serves as authority for the fact 
that where payment is made on cloned cheques, the risk will lie with the party 
acting outside its mandate, which findings could also perhaps find similar 
application where payment is made on cloned credit cards.
In attempting to answer the second question, bearing on the possibility of 
instituting delictual action based on the unauthorised use of the cloned card, it 
is conceivable that there would not necessarily be a contract (unless the con-
sumer had entered into a contract based on the original card and was somehow 
involved in the fabrication of a duplicate card) or terms and conditions relat-
ing to the cloned card. One would accordingly need to establish whether the 
cardholder or the issuer was negligent. If both are possibly negligent, it may be 
necessary to consider whether the Apportionment of Damages Act  of 195 
applies. Before exploring the provisions of this Act, one should bear in mind 
that it is important to carefully distinguish between the principles applicable to 
an action based on contract and an action founded upon delict, as different con-
siderations apply. A delict consists of a number of elements including wrong-
fulness, fault and causation, which should be clearly distinguished.0
The Apportionment of Damages Act  of 195 regulates the issue of con-
tributory fault and can be applied where not only the defendant was at fault but 
57 Nagel et al Commercial Law 1
58 Malan & Pretorius Malan on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes in South African Law 
pars 20 20  With regard to cheques specifically, it was said in Volkskas Bpk v Johnson 1979  SA 775 
(C) 777-778 that the bank is obliged to pay according to its tenor and only once this is done will the bank 
be entitled to debit its client’s account with the amount  See also Eskom v First National Bank of Southern 
Africa Ltd 1995 2 SA 8 (A)  See further Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock 198 2 All ER 
107 1118 where it is stated that a bank has a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in terms of the 
bank-client contract which standard is an objective one
59 198 AC 80 PC 10B-D  See further Pretorius & Van der Bijl 200 18:2 SA Merc LJ 202
0 SM Goldstein & Co (Pty) Ltd v Cathkin Park Hotel (Pty) Ltd 2000  SA 1019 (SCA) 102E-G; Neethling, 
Potgieter & Visser Law of Delict (200) 18-187
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where the plaintiff was also contributory negligent.1 The Apportionment of 
Damages Act provides that:
“(1)(1) (a) Where any person suffers damage which is caused partly by his own fault and partly by the 
fault of any other person, a claim in respect of that damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault 
of the claimant but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced by the court to such 
extent as the court may deem just and equitable having regard to the degree in which the claimant was 
at fault in relation to the damage.
 (b) Damage shall for the purpose of paragraph (a) be regarded as having been caused by a person’s 
fault notwithstanding the fact that another person had an opportunity of avoiding the consequences 
thereof and negligently failed to do so.
 (1)() For the purposes of this section ‘fault’ includes any act or omission which would, but for the 
provisions of this section, have given rise to the defence of contributory negligence.”
The Act will apply in instances of delictual liability where a person has been 
negligent in not exercising the reasonable standard of care applied in such a 
case. Negligence is present where a diligens paterfamilias would foresee the 
reasonable possibility of his conduct injuring another in his person or property, 
thus causing patrimonial loss, and would take reasonable steps to guard against 
such occurrence, but failed to take such steps.2
The test for negligence is therefore based on reasonable foreseeability and 
reasonable preventability of damage. It could be argued that where a credit 
card is used, loss due to credit card fraud is reasonably foreseeable, and that 
reasonable steps need to be taken to prevent such loss. As to what constitutes 
reasonable steps, one would necessarily need to take into account the cost of 
preventative measures. It could perhaps be seen as not reasonable where EMV 
smart card technology is not implemented in both the case of tripartite and 
bipartite credit cards. It has been shown that utilising a card reader machine 
that reads cards with both smart chips and magnetic stripes is not necessar-
ily a preventative measure against fraud. Would it be more reasonable to have 
different card reader machines for the different types of cards despite eco-
nomic implications? What happens when purchases are made over the inter-
net or telephone? If reasonable steps are not taken it could be argued that the 
ordinary principles of delictual liability could apply. Where both parties such 
as the supplier and issuer, or issuer and cardholder are negligent in some form, 
then the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956 could also possibly find 
application.
It is problematic, however, that section 1 of the Apportionment of Damages 
Act  of 195 is applicable to delictual claims but not to contractual claims. It 
would therefore appear not to be applicable to actions based on the unauthor-
1 S 1
2 Kruger v Coetzee 19 2 SA 28 (A) 0E-F; Neethling et al Law of Delict 12-1; Mkhatswa v Minister 
of Defence 2000 1 SA 100 (SCA) 1111-111; Sea Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Duncan Dock Cold 
Storage (Pty) Ltd 2000 1 SA 827 (SCA); Mukheiber v Raath 1999  SA 105 (SCA); Voet 9  2; Kelly 
“The Apportionment of Damages between a Negligent Collecting Bank and a Thief of Cheques: Does the 
Apportionment of Damages Act Apply?” 2001 1 SA Merc LJ 509 510
 Neethling et al Law of Delict 12-1; Kruger v Coetzee 19 2 SA 28 (A) 0E-F; Mkhatswa v Minister 
of Defence 2000 1 SA 100 (SCA) 1111-111; Sea Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Duncan Dock Cold 
Storage (Pty) Ltd 2000 1 SA 827 (SCA); Mukheiber v Raath 1999  SA 105 (SCA); Voet 9  2
 Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd v Singh 200  SA 0 (D) 7A
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ised use of a credit card founded on credit card contracts.5 In Thoroughbred 
Breeders’ Association v Price Waterhouse, Nienaber JA, Marais JA, Farlam 
JA and Brand AJA confirmed that the principle of contributory negligence is 
designed to address specific needs identified in the law of delict and not in 
the law of contract. In order to hold the issuer delictually liable on the basis 
of fault, one would therefore need to prove all the requirements of delictual 
liability. It could perhaps be argued that a standard of reasonableness is to be 
expected from an issuer. Kelly7 says in this regard that
“the standard of care should be measured by the general level of skill and diligence possessed and 
exercised at the relevant time of the conduct. A court may acknowledge the standard of care generally 
adopted by other members of the profession, but conformity with general practice is merely prima 
facie evidence of the absence of negligence.”
Although Kelly is as a matter of course referring to the negligence of a col-
lecting bank, it could surely be argued that a standard of care could perhaps 
also be introduced to issuers, especially as some issuers adopt additional secu-
rity measures to attempt to combat fraud, whereas others do not attempt to 
introduce the same measures as a safeguard against fraud. It could arguably 
be said that these latter issuers do not comply with general practice and could 
perhaps be held liable in terms of the law of delict if all the requirements are 
met.
Fault could be proved if it could be shown that the issuer paid out negli-
gently on the cloned credit card. Some examples of instances where negligence 
could perhaps be inferred and proved are where the signature on the transac-
tion slip used for the purchases made on the cloned credit card does not match 
the signature of the client; where it is proved that the personal details of the 
client were not safeguarded sufficiently so that a fraudster could have gained 
access to the personal details of the client, thus enabling him to fabricate a sub-
stitute card; where credit cards are mailed with an invitation to a prospective 
cardholder to make use of the opportunity and such cards are intercepted; or 
where the use of EMV was possible and the issuer was not EMV compliant. 
The issuer would have to prove that it took reasonable steps to ensure that pay-
ment was made on behalf of the correct person, namely the cardholder.
Some examples of where the cardholder could be negligent might be where 
he leaves his card lying around so that a fraudster gains easy access to the 
card to manufacture a cloned card; where transactions are made under circum-
stances in which payment is not secured, as might be the case with internet 
purchases where access to all the personal details of the client is possible; or 
where the details are provided telephonically. This might especially be seen to 
be the case where the issuer provides security measures which the cardholder 
does not utilise. An example of this could be where digital codes are sent elec-
tronically in addition to the furnishing of passwords. Negligence may also be 
specifically inferred where the use of an EMV card, with a special chip as a 
5 See OK Bazaars (1929) Ltd v Stern and Ekermans 197 2 SA 521 (C) 50
 2001  SA 551 (SCA) 591A-D 597E-F 0G-H
7 2001 1 SA Merc LJ 509 510
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special security feature, is not utilised despite the opportunity being presented 
to the client to make use of such system.
A few instances involving the supplier where negligence could possibly 
be inferred are where the supplier is also issuer and randomly mails credit 
cards to prospective customers, as is often the case with bipartite credit cards; 
where goods are supplied without properly verifying the identity of the cus-
tomer in instances where the system is offline; where goods for large amounts 
are provided; and where accounts are opened or transactions are concluded. 
In instances where bipartite credit card transactions are concluded it would be 
even more difficult to avoid being found negligent as the issuer/supplier would 
also inevitably have a sample signature of its cardholder. Such signature could 
easily be scanned into the computer system together with a photo and signature 
of the client and verified against the card signature used to complete the trans-
action. A card with a photo of the client together with a signature and hologram 
could rule out possible identity fraud and could also act as a safeguard measure 
where a smart card system is not used and the risk of fraud is perhaps greater.
5	 Conclusion
It has been shown that despite innovations in technology, the risk of unau-
thorised use of credit cards and the cloning of cards will persist in some form 
or another for a number of reasons:
It is foreseeable that it will take time to implement smart cards during the 
migration process from the mag-stripe process to smart card technology. It 
has been shown that fraud can still be perpetrated where a card reader accepts 
both types of technology. Furthermore, some institutions and suppliers may 
still prefer more traditional methods of payment for economic reasons. It is 
envisaged that problems may still arise where systems are offline and trans-
actions are nevertheless concluded with the use of a specific card.
The use of cards telephonically or internet shopping where cards are not 
presented, also present problems where traditional cards need to be used or 
details provided electronically and verification of the chip is not possible. 
Precautionary measures that could be undertaken to avoid cloning of credit 
cards or reduce the risks inherent in credit card use could include the use of 
holograms together with a photo and signature of the client, especially in the 
case of bipartite credit cards where holograms are not often encountered as 
this provide a practical solution in which a supplier can more readily ascer-
tain whether a specific card is valid or not.8
Instead of having a single swipe design one could have terminals with sepa-
rate mag-stripe and chip readers, which would admittedly be more expen-
sive and would have an impact on whether it is a reasonable measure to 
safeguard against fraud.9
8 “French Card Hacker Convicted” available at http:// www theregister co uk/2000/02/2/french_card_
hacker_convicted accessed 10 May 2007  See also Schulze 200 1 SA Merc LJ 70 705 which discusses 
the embossing of cards  
9 “Card Technology” Newsroom Global Newswatch vol 11 0/01/0 Card Tech 8 200 WLNR 991895
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It is perhaps foreseeable that PINS will become more vulnerable with 
increased use as envisaged with the smart card system. Increased usage 
of PINS could foreseeably increase the possibility of fraud.70 In such 
cases it would perhaps be better to have only a chip and PIN or improved 
software.71
As a reasonable measure to safeguard all parties concerned, insurance could 
be made a compulsory clause in the credit card contract to safeguard to limit 
the risks inherent with credit card use.
More stringent legislative measures could be adopted. Measures analogous 
to those adopted in the United States could perhaps be added to the National 
Credit Act 34 of 2005 to provide for penalties such as fines or imprisonment 
or provisions, which limit the cardholder’s liability in instances where there 
is unauthorised use of the original credit card. In doing so, it is foreseeable 
that issuers might take additional safeguards to limit their portion of the risk. 
The Act would not appear to apply to cloned credit cards but merely to con-
tracts concluded on the original card issued.
It would be useful if specific provisions regulating the use of cloned credit 
cards are also developed to facilitate legal certainty. It is at least certain that, 
despite welcome technological advances, it is unrealistic to expect a foolproof 
solution to fraud. In the meantime, issuers had best be prepared for continued 
parenting problems with their cloned offspring.
OPSOMMING
 Die EMV (Europay, Mastercard en Visa) stelsel is onlangs deur ABSA geïmplementeer. Die stelsel 
maak gebruik van ’n sogenaamde smart card skyfiekaart wat daarop gemik is om die ongemagtigde 
gebruik van kredietkaarte uit te skakel. Kaarte bevat spesiale skyfies met PIN-nommers wat die kaart-
houer identifiseer. Alhoewel hierdie stelsel ’n besondere vordering in tegnologie is, kom bedrog onge-
lukkig nog steeds voor. Verslae van bedrog in Brittanje en Frankryk is al gerapporteer. Onderskeie pro-
bleme kan moontlik ondervind word waar die stelsel nog nie volledig geïmplementeer word nie, soos in 
die geval waar kaartleesmasjiene beide magnetiese kaarte en smart-kaarte aanvaar; waar smart-kaarte 
nie gebruik word nie, soos byvoorbeeld in die geval van tweeledige kredietkaarte; en waar internet- en 
telefoniese aankope gemaak word. ’n Belangrike vraag wat beantwoord moet word is op wie die risiko 
rus – op die kaarthouer of op die uitreiker? Om hierdie vraag te beantwoord, word ’n onderskeid getref 
tussen die posisie waar daar ongemagtigde gebruik van die oorspronklike kredietkaart is, en die posisie 
waar ’n afsonderlike gekloonde kaart gebruik word. Daar word dan na die beginsels van kontraktereg en 
deliktereg gekyk om ’n moontlike oplossing te vind.
70 See in this regard Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd v Singh 200  SA 0 (D) 7A-D; “Algorithmic Research 
Reveals PIN Processing Weakness that Allow Payment-Card Fraud” available at http:// www smartcard-
strends com/det_atc php?idu (accessed 8 May 2007)
71 Card Technology” Newsroom Global Newswatch vol 11 0/01/0 Card Tech 8 200 WLNR 991895
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